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TOWARDS A POST-HISTORICIST PUNISHMENTS
CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creatorwith certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of
Happiness.

-Declaration

of Independence'

Does this nation in its maturity still cherish the faith in which it was
conceived and raised? Does it still hold those "truths to be selfevident"?
2

-Leo Strauss

INTRODUCTION

Historicism, according to German sociologist Ernst Troeltsch, is
"the recognition that all human ideas and values are historically conditioned and subject to change."' 3 By the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, this recognition "had become the dominant, inescapable attitude of the Western world."' 4 In the realm of the Supreme
Court's Punishments Clause jurisprudence, the historicist worldview
has come to guide the Court's hand. Instead of interpreting the Punishments Clause in accordance with some higher principle of right, it
has interpreted it on the basis of "the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society."'5 This historicist turn
carries grave ramifications, not only for the Punishments Clause, but
for the integrity of law itself. Its dependence on an outmoded conception of progress is fundamentally flawed, and its use of disparate
modes of legal reasoning is fundamentally incoherent. It is time to
look beyond the Court's historicist approach for a new way-a way
that gives permanent moral meaning to the Punishments Clause, but
does not reach beyond the foundational principles of the American
Republic.
1. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE parE. 2 (1776).

2. LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 1 (1953).
3. Georg G. Iggers, Historicism: The History and Meaning of the Term, 56 J.
133 (1995).
4. Id.
5. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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This Comment presents a critique of the Court's Punishments
Clause jurisprudence and points towards a horizon beyond historicism. Part II provides an overview of the background and interpretation of the Punishments Clause, along with a summary of the
historicist worldview. 6 Part III analyzes the Court's historicist interpretation and concludes that it is predicated upon a flawed conception
of progress and history. 7 It demonstrates that the Court's attempt to
blend historicism with independent judgment and positivism has
failed. 8 Part IV assesses the impact of the Court's historicist approach
and sets forth an alternate, post-historicist Punishments Clause jurisprudence. 9 In essence, this Comment invites a reconsideration of the
Court's Punishments Clause jurisprudence and the place of historicism within it. The hope remains that further contributions to this line
of inquiry will restore an approach to this area of law that is moral,
meaningful, and just.

II.

THE PUNISHMENTS CLAUSE AND HISTORICISM

This Part presents an overview of the background and interpretation of the Punishments Clause, as well as a summary of the historicist
worldview. It first looks at the text of the Eighth Amendment and
traces some early attempts by the Supreme Court to inject meaning
into its ambiguous language. 10 It then summarizes the development of
the Court's historicist interpretation of the text,1 taking note of alternative lines of Eighth Amendment interpretation proposed by Justices
William Brennan and Antonin Scalia.12 Finally, this Part summarizes
the historicist worldview, its foundational assumptions, and its impli3
cations for morality, law, and science.'
A.

The Text of the Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment reads as follows: "Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."14 The last clause, generally referred to as the Pun6. See infra notes 10-79 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 80-95 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 96-118 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 119-157 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 14-21 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 22-46 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 47-70 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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ishments Clause, has its origins in the English Bill of Rights of 1689.15
Although in England the phrase dealt with the infliction of punishments without statutory or judicial authorization, 6 in American law it
has been interpreted to bar allegedly brutal, malicious, or uncivilized
forms of punishment. 17 Unfortunately, the constitutional text itself
does not specify which punishments are cruel and unusual as a matter
of law. In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court felt "it [was]
safe to affirm that punishments of torture . . . and all others in the
same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by [the Eighth
Amendment]."' 8 Punishments believed to be "manifestly cruel and
unusual, [such] as burning at the stake, crucifixion, breaking on the
wheel, or the like," ran afoul of the Constitution. 9 Death by firing
20
squad, however, did not.
The Amendment's text does not explicitly state which punishments
are unconstitutional. The language of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments makes plain that the deprivation of life is contemplated
by the Constitution as a lawful form of punishment, subject to due
process considerations. 2 ' But there is no indication in the text as to
the permissible scope of the death penalty. It does not specify which
offenses may lawfully be penalized by death, nor does it make any
mention about which classes of offenders should be subject to an exemption. It is out of this void-or out of a need to fill it-that the
Court's historicist Punishments Clause jurisprudence has emerged.
B.

The Interpretation of the Punishments Clause in
the Light of "Evolving Standards"

In the Court's 1958 decision, Trop v. Dulles, Chief Justice Earl Warren announced, "The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amend15. Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original
Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 839 (1969); see also In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 445-46 (1890)
(discussing the parliamentary origins of the language in 1688).
16. Granucci, supra note 15, at 859-60.
17. See id. at 839-44; see also Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126, 136 (1903) (avoiding the
question of "what is necessary to render a punishment cruel and unusual"); Wilkerson v. Utah,
99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878) (discussing torture as a cruel form of punishment).
18. Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 136.
19. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 446.
20. Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 134-35.
21. GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION: A COMMENTARY 89
(1995). The relevant portion of the Fifth Amendment reads as follows: "No person shall be held
to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury . . . nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ....

"

U.S. CONST. amend. V. The language of the Fourteenth Amendment repeats the deprivation of
life prohibition, applying it against the states. U.S. CONST. amend XIV.

1324

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:1321

ment is nothing less than the dignity of man."'2 2 Since "the words of
the Amendment are not precise, and ... their scope is not static," the
Chief Justice proclaimed that the Amendment "must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society." 23 In setting forth this hermeneutical principle, the
Court left the Punishments Clause open to interpretation in the light
of shifting understandings. Though the Court's language clearly envisions a progressive understanding, the Trop opinion failed to unpack
the statement any further. It did, however, point to Weems v. United
States, where the Court stated "that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense."'2 4 Weems presaged the Trop declaration by noting that, "in the
opinion of the learned commentators," the Punishments Clause "may
be... progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice."'2 5 "Progress" and "humane justice" were left undefined.
Trop emphasized the need to exercise judgment in interpreting the
Punishments Clause, rather than relying simply on subjective preferences. 26 It would-take the Court almost twenty years to make this
rhetoric a reality. In Gregg v. Georgia, a plurality determined that the
"evolving standards of decency" by which the Punishments Clause
was interpreted should be assessed on the basis of "objective indicia
that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction. '27 Initially,
this included only legislative enactments and the sentencing behavior
of juries,28 but the Court later expanded its scope to include the views
of professional organizations as well as international law and opinion. 29 The impetus was the Court's plurality opinion in Coker v. Georgia, which announced the view that "the attitude of state legislatures"
is not wholly determinative: "[T]he Constitution contemplates that in
the end [the Court's] own judgment will be brought to bear on the
question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth
Amendment. '30 While this expansion of the relevant indicia was met
22. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
23. Id. at 100-01.
24. 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
25. Id. at 378.
26. Trop, 356 U.S. at 103.
27. 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion).
28. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 603 (1977) (plurality opinion) (citing Gregg, 428 U.S.
at 173-82).
29. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1988).
30. 433 U.S. at 597; accord Thompson, 487 U.S. at 833; Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797
(1982).
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with criticism-and even briefly rejected by the Court 3 1-it was never
permanently put to rest.
The more expansive approach returned in Atkins v. Virginia, though
it was given limited weight. 32 Just three years later, in Roper v. Simmons, the Court devoted considerable attention to both the positive
law of the international community 33 and the findings of social science 34 in holding that the death penalty was unconstitutional as applied to juveniles. 35 The Court applied social science to a Weems-style
proportionality analysis, 36 stating that "[c]apital punishment must be
limited to those offenders who commit 'a narrow category of the most
serious crimes' and whose extreme culpability make them 'the most
deserving of execution.'"37 In the opinion of the Court, social science
"tend[ed] to confirm" the "lack of maturity and ... underdeveloped
'38 It
sense of responsibility ... in youth more often than in adults.
also demonstrated that juveniles are susceptible "to negative influences and outside pressures, '39 and that a child's "character ...is not
as well formed as that of an adult. '40 For-these reasons, they could
not be classified as the worst offenders. The Court also referenced the
penological justifications of the death penalty-retribution and deterrence-and concluded that both applied to juveniles with "lesser
41
force" based on scientific findings.
This jurisprudence has resulted in a rapid-fire overturning of fairly
recent case law. In Atkins, the Court determined that, by 2002, standards had "evolved" to the point- Where executing a mentally retarded
offender violated the Eighth Amendment, 4 2 even though it had been
acceptable just thirteen years earlier. 43 Similarly, Roper overruled a
1989 determination that executing offenders between the ages of sixteen and eighteen was permissible. 44 When the Missouri Supreme
Court considered Roper and applied the "evolving standards" jurisprudence, it overruled precedent that permitted the execution of juve31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 377 (1989).
536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002).
543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005).
Id. at 568-75.
Id. at 578-79.
See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319).
Id. at 569 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 570.
Id. at 571.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
Roper, 543 U.S. 551, overruling Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 371-72, 380 (1989).
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nile offenders. 4 5 Even though the dissenters in Roper criticized this
clear abandonment of precedent, it was not addressed in the majority
46
opinion.
C.

Two Alternative Interpretations

Even though the Court's Punishments Clause jurisprudence has
been largely informed by the "evolving standards of decency," two
other avenues of interpretation have been proposed. The first is Justice Brennan's interpretation in the light of overarching concerns of
human dignity. 47 The second is Justice Scalia's originalist interpreta48
tion of the Eighth Amendment.
1.

Justice Brennan's Human Dignity Interpretation

Concurring in the holding in Furman v. Georgia, which temporarily
invalidated the death penalty, Justice Brennan took a unique step:
"[The Punishments Clause] prohibits the infliction of uncivilized and
inhuman punishments. The State, even as it punishes, must treat its
members with respect for their intrinsic worth as human beings. A
punishment is 'cruel and unusual,' therefore, if it does not comport
with human dignity. '49 Accompanying this definition was his "primary principle ... that a punishment must not be so severe as to be
degrading to the dignity of human beings. ' 50 Further, punishment
should not be arbitrarily imposed, 51 offensive to the values of society,52 or excessive. 53 On the basis of these principles, Justice Brennan
proposed asking "whether a punishment comports with human dignity."' 54 In this case, the answer was clear: "Death, quite simply, does
55
not."
Justice Brennan's Furman concurrence is notable in that it makes a
decidedly moral and absolute argument against the death penalty.
Though Justice Brennan's principle against arbitrary enforcement was
at the heart of the Court's decision to reinstate the death penalty in
45. See State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
46. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 593-94 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 628-30 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
47. See infra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
49. 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 271.
51. Id. at 274.
52. Id. at 277.
53. Id. at 279.
54. Id. at 305.
55. Furman, 408 U.S. at 305.
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Gregg,56 his dissent in that case reiterated his Furman position that
the death penalty was always a "cruel and unusual" punishment under
the Eighth Amendment. 5 7 Even his principle against excessiveness
contains a strong moral component, embedded in its condemnation of
"the pointless infliction of suffering. ' 58 It has not, however, resurfaced as a principle to guide the Court in deciding more recent death
penalty cases.
2. Justice Scalia's OriginalistInterpretation
In Stanford v. Kentucky, a case decided sixteen years before Roper,
the Court upheld the execution of juvenile offenders between the ages
of sixteen and eighteen.5 9 Justice Scalia wrote that, prior to examining
whether a punishment coheres with "evolving standards of decency,"
a court must first look to whether the punishment is grounded in the
Anglo-American legal tradition. 60 Since the tradition demonstrated
that an offender as young as seven could be executed at common law,
Justice Scalia found that applying the death penalty to juveniles was
not automatically barred by the Eighth Amendment. 61 Though Justice Scalia did not ignore "evolving standards of decency," he found
that this approach was only used to determine if a countervailing tradition had arisen; it was not sufficient in and of itself. 62 He also
sought to limit this line of inquiry to legislative enactments, 63 arguing
that polling data and the opinions of interest groups were unpersuasive. 64 This attempt to graft an alternative analysis onto the Court's
Punishments Clause jurisprudence was short-lived.
In Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court held that executing a mentally re65
tarded offender was not prohibited by the Eighth Amendment; Justice Scalia's approach was relegated to a separate opinion. 66 By the
time the Court reconsidered the question in Atkins, Justice Scalia's
interpretation became the dissent. There, as in Penry,67 he applied an
56. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (plurality opinion).
57. Id. at 227-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58. Furman, 408 U.S. at 279 (Brennan, J.,concurring).
59. 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
60. Id. at 368-69.
61. Id. at 368. In a dissent penned a year earlier, Justice Scalia had used the same analysis to
argue for the legal permissibility of executing a fifteen-year-old offender. See Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 864 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
62. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369-70.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 373-74.
65. 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989).
66. Id. at 350-60 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
67. See id. at 351-52.
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originalist interpretation, finding that "[o]nly the severely or profoundly mentally retarded . . .enjoyed any special status under the
law" when the Eighth Amendment was adopted. '68 Thus, other mentally retarded offenders could be subject to execution. 69 Just three
years later, in Roper, this line of analysis had been relegated to a
70
footnote.
D.

The Historicist Worldview

The historicist worldview, in the assessment of Leo Strauss, came
about as a response to the intellectual upheavals of the Enlightenment
that asserted natural rights justifications for the reordering of society. 71 The historicist approach was a means of upholding the traditions of society with principles drawn from history.72 For those
principles to be meaningful, however, history had to be coherent, rational, and progressive. In time, the belief in history's coherence and
rationality waned, 73 giving rise to a more radical form of historicism:
"History-history divorced from all dubious or metaphysical assumptions-became the highest authority. '74 Strauss explained the shortcomings of this view:
Human thought is essentially limited in such a way that its limitations differ from historical situation to historical situation and that
the limitation characteristic of the thought of a given epoch cannot
be overcome by any human effort. There always have been and
there always will be surprising, wholly expected, changes of outlook
which radically modify the meaning of all previously acquired
knowledge. No view of the whole, and in particular no view of the
whole of human life, can claim to be final or universally valid.
Every doctrine, however seemingly
final, will be superseded sooner
75
or later by another doctrine.
68. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 340 (2002) (Scalia, J.,dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
69. Id. at 340-41.
70. See 543 U.S. 551, 609 n.1 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
71. STRAUSS,supra note 2, at 13-14; see also LEOPOLD VON RANKE, On the Relation of and
DistinctionBetween History and Politics, in THE SECRET OF WORLD HISTORY: SELECTED WRITINGS ON THE ART AND SCIENCE OF HISTORY 105 (Roger Wines trans., 1981). It was Ranke who
observed, in the nineteenth century, that "[tihe error of the philosophers of the last century was
that they formulated a universal doctrine according to which every state must be ruled." Id. at
116.
72. See Iggers, supra note 3. For further discussions and explorations into historicism, see
PAUL HAMILTON, HISTORICISM (2d ed. 2003); GEORG G. IGGERS, THE GERMAN CONCEPTION
OF HISTORY:
PRESENT

THE NATIONAL TRADITION OF HISTORICAL THOUGHT FROM HERDER TO THE
LEONARD KRIEGER, RANKE. THE MEANING OF HISTORY (1977); PE-

(rev. ed. 1983);

TER HANNS REILL, THE GERMAN ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE RISE OF HISTORICISM

73. See Iggers, supra note 3, at 132-33.
74. STRAUSS, supra note 2, at 17.
75. Id. at 21.

(1975).
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Philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre noted that this worldview is essentially relative: "Morality which is no particular society's morality is to
be found nowhere. There was the-morality-of-fourth-century-Athens,
there were the-moralities-of-thirteenth-century-Western-Europe,
there are numerous such moralities, but where ever was or is morality
as such?" 76 This turn has a similar impact on law itself. Quoting German jurist Karl Bergbohm, Strauss highlighted that Bergbohm's
"strict argument against the possibility of natural right... is based on
'the undeniable truth that nothing eternal or absolute exists,"' and
"that 'the standards with reference to which we pass judgment on the
historical, positive law ... are themselves absolutely the progeny of
their time and are always historical and relative." 77 Historicism undermines the universal character of social science by holding the subjectively selected inquiries that animate it to be a product of a given
scientist's historical situation. 78 The truth of its conclusions are relative at best; it is certainly no more privileged as a means to compre79
hend the world than other relative orientations.
III.

HISTORICISM AND POSITIVISM IN THE
COURT'S JURISPRUDENCE

This Part analyzes the Court's historicist interpretation of the Punishments Clause, demonstrating that it is predicated upon a flawed
conception of both progress and history. 80 It further illustrates that
the Court's attempt to bolster this jurisprudence through the use of
independent judgment, along with scientific and legal positivism, is
81
incoherent.
A.

The Pitfall of a HistoricistJurisprudence

An accurate analysis of the Court's historicist Punishments Clause
jurisprudence must begin with an account of the assumptions that underlie it. Though Trop offered the most explicit principle of this his76. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 265-66 (2d ed. 1984). Strauss echoed this concern with regards to political philosophy: "Plato's political philosophy is essentially related to
the Greek city of the fourth century B.C., just as Locke's political philosophy is essentially related to the English revolution of 1688." LEO STRAUSS, WHAT IS POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY?:
AND OTHER STUDIES 63 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1988) (1959). Thus, "no political philosophy can
reasonably claim to be valid beyond the historical situation to which it is essentially related." Id.
77. STRAUSS, supra note 2, at 10 n.3 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted).
78. See id. at 36-39 (discussing the historicist challenge to social science and Max Weber's
response to it).
79. STRAUSS, supra note 76, at 25-26 (discussing the rejection of science's authority by
historicism).
80. See infra notes 82-95 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 96-118 and accompanying text.
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toricism, 82 the seeds were already planted in Weems. Unfortunately,
the Court did not engage in the effort to fertilize its opinion with a
cogently reasoned definition of the Punishments Clause. 8 3 In holding
that the Punishments Clause "may be ...progressive" and "acquire
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice,"'84 the Court did not explain why the clause is progressive and
how this alleged progress ought to be understood in future cases. At
face value, the words themselves evoke a teleological conception of
history in which human society grows more enlightened with the
march of time. Even if the Weems Court was trying to be coy, it is not
difficult to discern that this conception of the Eighth Amendment had
as little interest in keeping to standards drawn from the well of time as
it did in precision. That such a clear Enlightenment value as "progress" could be bound up in a judicial decision in 1910, prior to the
Great War, is not surprising. What is surprising, however, is that in
the nearly fifty years that separated Trop from Weems, the Court
never recovered from the hangover brought on by its intoxication with
the idea of progress. 85 In Trop, the Court even made the bald assertion that American democracy was "an enlightened democracy" and,
for that reason, the Court seldom had the opportunity to properly de86
fine the Punishments Clause.
The dubious nature of the Court's decision to crown the United
States as "enlightened" in 1958, while the country was still roiled in
racial turmoil, should be obvious. Also obvious is that the Court once
again failed to give an account of what it meant by "progress." The
Court inextricably linked its belief in progress to historicism by positing that "standards of decency" evolve with the age of society rather
than remaining available to human reason, but this linkage hardly elucidated the matter. In fact, it obscured the definition of progress fur82. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958).
83. The Court offered only the following: "What constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment
has not been exactly decided. It has been said that ordinarily the terms imply something inhuman and barbarous, torture and the like." Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910).
The Court then proceeded through a pedantic account of the nebulous understanding of the
Punishments Clause in both treatises and case law. Id. at 368-78.
84. Id. at 378.
85. The intellectual revolt against the Enlightenment was already well underway by the time
the Court penned the Trop decision. Following two World Wars and the catastrophes surrounding them, the faith in a reasoned, historical progression was under attack. In fact, reasonspecifically Enlightenment-style positive reason-was set as a prime target for the enterprise of
critical theory. See generally MAX HORKHEIMER, ECLIPSE OF REASON (Continuum 2004) (1947);
MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR W. ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT: PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS (Gunzelin Schmid Noerr ed., Edmund Jephcott trans., Stanford Univ. Press
2002) (1947).
86. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100.
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ther by making its measure the handmaid of history; the Court offered
no governing principle to distinguish the movement of history from
bad to good or reasonable to insane. To accept the Court's words in
Trop, one would have to be prepared to accept their transition from
87
jurists to prophets.
Assuming that divinization is beyond the realm of possibility for
even the highest court in the land, confronting their thinking philosophically is not unwarranted. At a minimum, the very notion of progress is problematic in that it "means that certain questions, the basic
questions can be settled once and for all, so that the answers to these
questions can be taught to children, so that subsequent generations
simply can build up the solutions found out by earlier generations,
without bothering any longer about the basic questions," and thus
"that the answers to the basic questions can be taken for granted, that
they can be permitted to become prejudices for all generations after
that of the founding fathers." 88 In other words, the Court has held
that the meaning of the text of the Eighth Amendment progresses.
This approach leads down a pathway of nuances and accretions, the
legitimacy of which remain unquestioned because of an unproven assumption that these alterations-subtle though they may be-are for
the better.8 9 It forecloses a return to the actual meaning on the
grounds that doing so is a regression.
And what of the "standards of decency"? The fact that the Court's
jurisprudence accepts that those standards evolve confines the inquiry
to the present, regardless of the state of that present. To return again
to Strauss, his observations on law are a compelling response to this
jurisprudential assumption:
Now it is obviously meaningful, and sometimes even necessary, to
speak of "unjust" laws or "unjust" decisions. In passing such judgments we imply that there is a standard of right and wrong independent of positive right and higher than positive right: a standard with
87. Cf JOHANN GOTTFRIED VON HERDER, Older Critical Forestlet,in PHILOSOPHICAL WRIT257, 259 (Michael N. Forster trans., 2002) (remarking that "historical seeing stops and
prophecy begins" when historians attempt to overreach in their endeavors).
INGS

88. Leo Strauss, The Living Issues of German Postwar Philosophy (1940), in
MEIER, LEO STRAUSS AND THE THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL PROBLEM

HEINRICH

115, 123-24 (Marcus Brai-

nard trans., 2006).

89. In the century preceding the establishment of the Court's historicist Punishments Clause
jurisprudence, the Catholic counterrevolutionary tradition had already contended with the spiritual, metaphysical, and political outcomes of progressive conception of the historical process.
Cf. JUAN DONOSO CORT9S, Letter to CardinalFornarion the Errors of Our Times, in SELECTED
WORKS OF JUAN DONOSO CORTPS 101, 103-04 (Jeffrey P. Johnson trans., 2000) (arguing that a
belief in the perfection of human things comes as a result of denying man's sinfulness); JOSEPH
DE MAISTRE, CONSIDERATIONS ON FRANCE 32-33 (Richard A. Lebrun trans., 1994) (arguing
against the establishment of innovative political forms on the basis of a static history).
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reference to which we are able to judge ofpositive right. Many people today hold theview that the standard in question is in the best
case nothing but the ideal adopted by our society or our "civilization" and embodied in its way of life or its institutions. But, according to the same view, all societies have their ideals, cannibal
societies no less than civilized ones. If principles are sufficiently justified by the fact that they are accepted by a society, the principles
of cannibalism are as defensible or sound as those of civilized
life.... And, since the ideal of our society is admittedly changing,
nothing except dull and stale habit could prevent us from placidly
accepting a change in the direction of cannibalism. 90
Hyperbole aside, a jurisprudence so self-consciously tethered to historically variable convention has the potential to fail. This apparently
did not sway the Court. Instead, they became what Nietzsche called
"historical men": "Looking into the past urges them toward the future, incites them to take courage and continue to engage in life, and
kindles the hope that things will yet turn out well and that happiness is
to be found behind the mountain toward which they are striding." 9 1
This is intelligible insofar as the Court believed it had observed a
movement from barbarism to humanity in recent history. Still, as Justice Scalia has warned, "the risk of assessing evolving standards is that
it is all too easy to believe that evolution has culminated in one's own
views."' 92 If those views find revulsion in the practice of flogging or
see strong measures taken against criminals as unbecoming of an "enlightened democracy," the interpretation. of history reveals a progress
towards some ill-defined pinnacle of "humane justice." What must be
admitted, however, is that this direction upward is in no sense obvious. Like their historicist forebears, the Court has fallen into the difficulty that "[b]y denying the significance, if not the existence, of
universal norms, [it] destroyed the only solid basis of all efforts to
transcend the actual. '93 The fact that the "actual" shifts for the Court
is readily apparent; less apparent is the direction. This too follows the
logic of the historicists who believed "history was.., the only empirical, and hence the only solid, knowledge of what is truly human, of
90. STRAUSS, supra note 2, at 2-3.
91. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE ADVANTAGE AND DISADVANTAGE OF HISTORY FOR LIFE

§ 1, at 13 (Peter Preuss trans., 1980); cf. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL:
PRELUDE TO A PHILOSOPHY OF THE FUTURE § 224, at 152 (Walter Kaufmann trans., Vintage
Books 1989) ("As men of the 'historical sense' we also have our virtues; that cannot be denied:
we are unpretentious, selfless, modest, courageous, full of self-overcoming, full of devotion, very
grateful, very patient, very accommodating; but for all that we are perhaps not paragons of good
taste.").
92. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 865 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
93. STRAUSS, supra note 2, at 15.
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man as man: of his greatness and misery. ' 94 Yet, as Strauss has observed, "To the unbiased historian, 'the historical"process' revealed
itself as the meaningless web spun by what men did, produced, and
thought, no more than by unmitigated chance-a tale told by an idiot."'95 Sadly, the idiot's tale became the authoritative wisdom for the
genesis of the Court's Punishments Clause jurisprudence.
B.

The Problems with Positivism

The Court has turned to both legal and scientific positivism to bolster its Punishments Clause decisions. With respect to the latter, its
use has come in conjunction with the Court's own independent judgment in interpreting the Eighth Amendment. 96 The use of this independent judgment is fundamentally incompatible with the Court's
historicism. 97 The use of scientific positivism on the part of the Court
is of limited value, given the Court's approach. 98 The reference to
legal positivism within the Court's historicist jurisprudence also
presents problems. 99
1.

The Incoherency of the Independent Judgment Rule

In addition to the Court interpreting the Punishments Clause by the
"evolving standards of decency," it has continually reasserted its right
to bring its own independent "judgment... to bear on the question of
the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment."' 1 This use of independent judgment to interpret the Punishments Clause has met with stiff criticism from Justice Scalia. In his
reading, this "rule ... is reflected solely in dicta and never once in a
holding" and "has no foundation in law or logic." 1'0 As to its foundation in law, the reality is that the approach, legitimate or not, has remained relevant to the Court's historicist jurisprudence. At first
blush, it may even seem that the exercise of independent judgment
makes for a sturdy rope to help hoist the Court out of the pitfalls of
historicism. This is where Justice Scalia's indictment of its foundation
in logic becomes critical: to hold that the Eighth Amendment takes its
94. Id. at 17.
95. Id. at 18.
96. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
97. See infra notes 100-103 and accompanying text.
98. See infra notes 104-113 and accompanying text.
99. See infra notes 114-118 and accompanying text.
100. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations
omitted); accord Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313 (2002) (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 597 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
101. Roper, 543 U.S. at 615-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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meaning from society's "evolving standards of decency" is fundamentally incompatible with an approach that posits an equally (if not
more) valuable standard. If the historicism that animates the Court's
jurisprudence is correct, then the independent judgment of the Court
is no less free from the historical process than the standards of society.
If there is a conflict, then it would be a conflict of taste, pedigree,
Weltanschauung, and so forth; the privileging of the Court's judgment
over the collective judgment of society stands, in the light of historicism, as a willful power grab. Or, in the words of Justice Scalia, it "is
to replace judges of the law with a committee of philosopher102
kings."
What is also of critical relevance is the fact that, according to the
analysis of Professor William Heffernan, "the public-sentiment dog
has wagged the tail of independent judicial judgment. ' 10 3 That is, the
Court has never exercised its own judgment against the perceived
standards of society, and has never offered a substantial principle to
guide any future disagreement. As a point of legal history, then, the
independent judgment rule is not a proven bulwark against historicism. At some point in the future, the Court could become stacked
with Justices willing to baldly assert their judgment over and against
that of society. But to do so coherently, they would have to put to bed
the Court's historicist Punishments Clause jurisprudence once and for
all.
2.

Social Science in the Horizon of Historicism

The use of social science by the Court to determine the "evolving
standards of decency" has come in two forms. The first is drawn from
polling data on the American populace, 10 4 the second from the studies
of social scientists. 10 5 But the Court has never explained how the presumably static findings of social science give rise to any particular
value, especially given the Court's transitory view of standards in its
Punishments Clause jurisprudence. In the use of polling data, for example, the Court may be correct that it demonstrated "a widespread
consensus among Americans... that executing the mentally retarded
is wrong. ' 10 6 But that opinion is no more persuasive than a poll which
102. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 379 (1989).
103. William C. Heffernan, Constitutional Historicism: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment Evolving Standards of Decency Test, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1355, 1381 (2005).
104. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21.
105. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 568-74.
106. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21. In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist offered a strong
argument against the "blind-faith credence" the Court accorded to opinion polls in its decision.
Id. at 326 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("An extensive body of social science literature describes
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shows most Americans believe the Earth is flat or that human slavery
is just. 1° 7 Its only true usefulness within the Court's historicism is
methodological. It makes no strides towards interpreting social fiat,
but rather offers the Court another means by which to hold to the
historically transient views of society without regard for their rightness
or wrongness.
These problems become more evident in the Court's use of social
science studies. In Roper, the Court relied on their findings to conclude that certain "general differences between juveniles under 18 and
adults demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be
classified among the worst offenders." 10 8 This conclusion supported
the Court's holding that punishing juveniles with death for the crime
of murder was not proportionate. 10 9 The "values" to which the Court
made reference its discussion were the penological justifications for
the death penalty-retribution and deterrence-and the belief that
the penalty ought to apply only to the worst offenders." 0 The problem for the Court remains, however, the reality that social science itself cannot give rise to those values, even if it may support them. The
availability of a contradictory reading of the facts animated by equal
or greater logical rigor would undoubtedly throw even that limited
applicability of social science into question. 1 '
how methodological and other errors can affect the reliability and validity of [the data]. Everything from variations in the survey methodology ... and the statistical analyses used to interpret
the data can skew the results."). For the full analysis, including an appendix of examples, see id.
at 328-37.
107. Note Strauss's example (drawn from the position of Max Weber): "No conclusion can be
drawn from any fact as to its valuable character, nor can we infer the factual character of something from its being valuable or desirable." STRAUSS, supra note 2, at 39. Further, "[b]y showing
that certain religious or ethical ideas had a very great effect or no effect, one does not say
anything about the value of those ideas." Id. at 39-40. This opposition, typically described as
the opposition of the "is" and the "ought," confines modern social science in this way; valuesespecially those which are held to accord with right-must find their basis elsewhere. See NASSER BEHNEGAR, LEO STRAUSS, MAX WEBER, AND THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF POLITICS 72-76
(2003).
108. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569. These "general differences" included an "underdeveloped sense
of responsibility" that leads to reckless behavior, the susceptibility of juveniles "to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure," and "the character of a juvenile [which]
is not as well formed as that of an adult." Id. at 569-70. The use of these factors to support a
categorical rule exempting juveniles from the death penalty was heavily criticized by both Justice
Scalia and Justice O'Connor in their respective dissents. Justice Scalia has observed, "At most,
these studies conclude that, on average, or in most cases, persons under 18 are unable to take
moral responsibility for their actions. Not one of the cited studies opines that all individuals
under 18 are unable to appreciate the nature of their crimes." Id. at 618 (Scalia, J. dissenting);
accord id. at 598-604 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 570-74 (majority opinion).
110. Id. at 569, 571.
111. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 616-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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While it may be possible that the factual conclusions of social science the Court used are steady in their logical rigor, and hence not
subject to change, the values the Court identifies are themselves historically relative. While "social science is said to be a body of true
propositions about social phenomena" that provide answers to certain
questions, "the questions depend on one's direction of interest, and
hence on one's values, i.e., on subjective principles.' ' 112 Under the horizon of historicism, these values cannot be timeless because they cannot be divorced from the historical process itself." 3 It would be
inconsistent for the Court to hold that the principles embodied in social science are timeless, while the "evolving standards of decency"
are not. The best the Court can claim to be doing is keeping with the
times-whether civilized or barbaric.
3.

Legal Positivism and Historicism

The Court has turned to legal positivism in two distinct ways. The
first has looked at "objective indicators of society's evolving standards" in the form of legislative enactments and the behavior of juries. 114 The second, more controversial approach has looked to the
positive law of the international community. 115 Both approaches exclude an evaluation of the rightness or wrongness of the laws in question; they serve as reference points indicating the apparent content of
society's historically variable standards.
Of particular significance is the use of international law, because the
Court has failed to inquire into how that law is applied and in what
judicial context. 116 There also exists, in the opinion of Justice Scalia,
an abiding contradiction running through the Court's jurisprudence in
its selective use of international law. 117 In his words, "To invoke alien
law when it agrees with one's own thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is
not reasoned decisionmaking, but sophistry. 11 8 It is here, perhaps,
that the independent judgment rule makes itself felt most strongly,
even though the Court has never used the positive law of another
country to overrule what it perceived as the "evolving standards of
decency" of American society. Even if the Court were to engage in a
112. STRAUSS, supra note 76, at 25.
113. BEHNEGAR, supra note 107, at 70-71.
114. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 603 (1977) (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
115. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 575-78; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 n.31 (1988).
116. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 624-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 627.
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more substantial evaluation of the positive law it chose to incorporate,
that would not cleanse it of historicism. The positive law is treated
only as a means by the Court to further its historicist jurisprudence;
not once in these decisions did the Court assign any law a higher authority on the basis of any normative principle. Like the Court's use
of social science, the incorporation of an analysis of the positive law is
only a methodological device.
IV.

BEYOND HISTORICISM

Montesquieu was certainly correct when, in his erudite consideration of the Romans, he observed that the laws "are never stronger
than when they reinforce the dominant passion of the nation for which
they are made." 119 The problem that the Court ignored in establishing its historicist Punishments Clause jurisprudence is that those
"dominant passions" may be patently unjust. This Part continues the
critique of the Court's approach and assesses its impact. 120 It then
posits a horizon beyond historicism. 12 1 Finally, this Part offers a posthistoricist Punishments Clause jurisprudence that takes into account
the alternate approaches of Justices Scalia and Brennan while over122
coming their difficulties.
A.

The Impact of the Court's Historicist Jurisprudence

It is undeniable that the Court's interpretation of the Punishments
Clause has moved in one direction-toward the abolition of the death
penalty. Both Atkins and Roper, in striking down the application of
the death penalty to the mentally retarded and juveniles, overruled
Court precedent that had less than two decades to ferment. 123 As the
reasoning goes, challenges to the applicability of the death penalty to
other classes of offenders would further erode its place in the criminal
justice system.1 24 Thus, what the historicist interpretation has allowed
is an ambling approach: whatever society wants, society gets. This
approach says nothing about the correctness of society's want; it
119. MONTESQUIEU, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE CAUSES OF THE GREATNESS OF THE ROMANS
AND THEIR DECLINE 233 (David Lowenthal trans., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1999).
120. See infra notes 123-132 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 133-140 and accompanying text.
122. See infra notes 141-157 and accompanying text.
123. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), overruled by Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (execution of juveniles); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), overruled by Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304 (2002) (execution of the mentally retarded).
124. Jennifer Eswari Borra, Current Event, Roper v. Simmons, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL'Y & L. 707, 715 (2005).
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blindly defers. 25 As such, the.progressivist vision that underlies the
approach, as well as the apparent hopes of those offended by the
death penalty, remain at the mercy of history. The inevitable triumph
of humane justice over barbarism is less than certain. On the basis of
the Court's historicism, it is far from clear whether such a move would
be the right move-rather than simply the movement of the times.
If it is impossible to be objectively confident that "standards of decency" are indeed progressing and that society's maturation is inevitably for the better, the future of the death penalty (or any punishment,
for that matter) remains an open question. In fact, nothing stated in
the opinions of the Court or reasonably implicit in its jurisprudence
demonstrates that any society-even one at the peak of its alleged
progress-would necessarily find the death penalty, flogging, or dismemberment "cruel and unusual." Consider the words of Sammuel
Livermore on punishment:
No cruel and unusual punishment is to be inflicted; it is sometimes
necessary to hang a man, villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps having ears cut off; but are we to be prevented from inflicting
these punishments because they are cruel? If a more lenient mode
of correcting vice and deterring others from the commission of it
could be invented, it would be very prudent in the Legislature to
adopt it; but until we have some security that this will be done, we
ought not to be restrained
from making necessary laws by any dec1 26
laration of this kind.
Setting aside any modern indictment of Livermore's mind-set, his
words express what is implicit in the Punishments Clause itself: the
need for society to thwart crime and punish criminals. Any consideration of how to meet that need requires the commitment and concern
of reasonable persons; it cannot be left to blow with the winds of
change.
The Court's historicist jurisprudence also implicates the integrity of
law itself. In his masterwork, The Politics, Aristotle commented on
changes in the law: "[L]aw has no strength with respect to obedience
apart from habit, and this is not created except over a period of time.
Hence the easy alteration of existing laws in favor of new and different ones weakens the power of law itself. ' 127 This weakening has already begun, as evidenced by the internal instability of the Court's
interpretation of the Punishments Clause, as well as by the decision of
the lower court in Roper to blatantly disregard the Court's then-set125. See supra notes 82-118 and accompanying text.
126. ANASTAPLO, supra note 21, at 89 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 754 (Joseph Gales
ed., 1789)).
127. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 73 (Carnes Lord trans., 1984).
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tied precedent. 2 8 That is not surprising given the nebulousness of the
Court's Punishments Clause jurisprudence. A principle that purposefully espouses history as its beacon is susceptible to not only a change
of course, but frequent change. This may be better for a particular
end, but is hardly beneficial for law itself.
Aristotle's observation that "all seek not the traditional but the
good"' 2 9 is far from assured today, but this is not to say that change in
the law is never permissible or beneficial:
[H]uman law is a dictate of reason by which human acts are directed. Accordingly, there can be two reasons why human law may
be justly changed: one having to do with reason, the other having to
do with man, whose acts are regulated by law. As regards reason, it
seems natural for human reason to advance gradually from the imperfect to the perfect .... So too in practical matters; for those who

first set out to discover something useful for the community of mankind, because they were not by themselves able to take everything
into account, made certain imperfect arrangements which were deficient in many ways; and these were changed by their successors,
who made other arrangements which would fail to secure the common welfare in fewer cases.
As regards man, whose acts are regulated by law, the law can be
rightly changed because of the changed circumstances of man, to
things are expedient according to different
whom different
130
conditions.
The key here is that law is sought out through the advance of reason,
not history. The usefulness of any punishment may be considered in
conjunction with the changing circumstances of humanity, not a
change in attitude. Laws suitable for an angelic society are not suitable for one steeped in depravity.13 1 On the other hand, a society that
would orient itself by the virtue of mercy has considerably more to
take into account in assessing the permissiveness of any punishment,

128. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
129. ARISTOTLE, supra note 127, at 73.
130. THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae IaIlae 97, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 149, 150 (R.W.
Dyson trans., 2002); cf. FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, On Law, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 183, 184

(Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrance eds., 1991) (noting the distinction between laws that are
ignored and laws that are neglected).
131. Aquinas himself recognized that, just as "the health of the whole body requires the removal of some member, perhaps because it is diseased or causing the corruption of other members," so too ought "some man [who] is dangerous to the community, causing its corruption
because of some sin . . .be slain in order to preserve the common good; for 'a little leaven
corrupteth the whole lump."' THOMAS ACQUINAS, Summa Theologiae IIaIIae 64, in POLITICAL
WRITINGS, supra note 130, at 251, 253-54 (quoting 1 Corinthians5:6).
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especially one that deprives a human being-of his or her life. 132 What
remains crucial is the Valuation'of what is right over what is desired.
B. Looking to a Horizon Beyond Historicism
Strauss observed that, in spite of what history or "the complexity of
human affairs may blur" with respect to knowledge, historicism "cannot extinguish[ ] the evidence of those simple experiences regarding
right and wrong which are at the bottom of the philosophic contention
that there is a natural right."'1 33 In other words, "It is prudent to grant
that there are value conflicts which cannot in fact be settled by human
reason. But if we cannot decide which of two mountains whose peaks
are hidden by clouds is higher[,] ... cannot we decide that a mountain

is higher than a molehill?"' 134 Undoubtedly, the question of when and
to whom it is appropriate to apply a punishment like death invariably
sets one on mountainous terrain, where the clouds of competing interests over retribution, deterrence, and humanity may obscure the
peaks. Perhaps that is true of all punishment. Yet in spite of that, the
Court has contented itself with allowing public opinion to guess not
which peak is higher, but which is momentarily preferable. If that
should appear reasonable to the modern eye, it is only because it has
grown accustomed to not looking at the best available reports of what
indeed are the highest peaks. Does not the United States-being a
nation founded upon. "the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God,"
which guarantees "certain unalienable rights" to all human beingshave such a report? 135 What neither the historicist worldview nor the
Court appear to believe, however, is that such a report exists or, if it
does, that it ought to be considered.
There are obvious concerns here. A mere invocation of natural law
"out of thin air" is likely to meet with a wall of incredulity. Even
Christian theologian Reinhold Niebhur confessed a need "to appreciate the perennial corruptions of interest and passion which are introduced into any historical definition of even the most ideal and abstract
moral principles. ' 136 "The question which must be raised," in
Neibuhr's estimation, "is whether the reason by which standards of
132. In the words of St. Augustine, "Avoid the death penalty, so that there's someone left to
repent. Don't allow the human being to be killed; then someone will be left to learn the lesson."
AUGUSTINE, Sermon 13, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 119, 124 (E.M. Atkins & R.J. Dodaro eds.,

2001).
133. STRAUSS, supra note 2, at 31-32.
134. STRAUSS, supra note 76, at 22-23.

135.
136.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1776).
REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE CHILDREN OF LIGHT AND THE CHILDREN OF DARKNESS:

VINDICATION OF DEMOCRACY AND A CRITIQUE OF ITS TRADITIONAL DEFENSE

70 (1960).

A
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justice are established is really so pure that the standard does not contain an echo and an accent of the claims of the class or the culture, the
1 37
nation or the hierarchy which presumes to define the standard."'
The Swiss Reformed theologian Karl Barth held more radical beliefs:
The tasks and problems which the Christian community is called to
share, in fulfillment of its political responsibility, are "natural," secular, profane tasks and problems. But the norm by which it should
be guided is anything but natural: it is the only norm which it can
believe in and accept as a spiritual norm, and is derived from the
clear law of its own faith, not from the obscure workings of a system
of this norm that it will make its
outside itself: it is from knowledge
138
decisions in the political sphere.
Where Neibuhr offers caution, Barth calls for rejection. Yet neither
would deny that it is in the image and likeness of God that man was
created. 139 It is on such a Biblical basis that the late Pontiff of the
Catholic Church, John Paul II, could hold that "[n]ot even a murderer
loses his personal dignity, and God himself pledges to guarantee
this."' 140 Stepping away from the sea of doctrinal differences and principles of theological interpretation that separate these men, what is at
the heart of their concerns here is the truth, which ought to guide
decisionmaking and which is not limited to historical whim. Whether
this is on the basis of faith alone or principles discoverable by human
reason, the goal is to avoid a blind submission to human prejudice.
The orientation must be toward a transcendent principle that itself is
not subject to historical whim, even if the turns in human convention
create an environment where it is neither sought nor generally recognized. If such a principle could be found in the cornerstone of the
American political community itself, would it not be appropriate to
turn the judicial gaze in that direction to secure a guiding truth over
fleeting fancy?
C. A Post-historicistPunishments Clause Jurisprudence
Whatever practical failings and theoretical problems historicism
may have, there is little doubt that it has purchase in contemporary
137. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, FAITH AND HISTORY:
ERN VIEWS OF HISTORY 186 (1949).

A COMPARISON OF CHRISTIAN AND MOD-

138. KARL BARTH, COMMUNIrrY, STATE, AND CHURCH: THREE ESSAYS 165 (1960).

139. See Genesis 1:26-27 (King James).
140. POPE JOHN PAUL II, EVANGELIUM VITAE T 9 (1995) (emphasis omitted). In the same
document, John Paul II limited the permissibility of imposing capital punishment to "cases of
absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society."

Id. 1 56.
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consciousness. 141 This reality does not defeat the possibility of moving
beyond historicism in certain areas of life. Still, it may mean relinquishing the rhetoric of absolutes and transcendence in order to sell
the move. In two respects, Justice Scalia's originalist interpretation of
the Punishments Clause offers an important roadmap for how this
might be accomplished. 142 First, though it is itself a form of historicism, Justice Scalia's approach solves the problem of variance, which
is one of the core difficulties of the "evolving standards of decency"
approach. By grounding his interpretation in the American legal tradition, Justice Scalia's approach injects stability into the clause's
meaning. Second, by holding to the American legal tradition as opposed to the legal cultures of foreign countries, the originalist approach would not succumb to the criticism of importing alien values
into the law.
His approach does, however, have two notable difficulties. First
and foremost, as Justice John Paul Stevens pointed out in his Roper
concurrence, a straight originalist reading of the Eighth Amendment
"would impose no impediment to the execution of 7-year-old children
today."'1 4 3 Further, such a low bar would have the practical effect of
punting the issue of a punishment's legitimacy back into the arms of
the legislatures, so long as nothing crossed the threshold of eighteenth-century penal measures. Justice Scalia himself appears cognizant of these difficulties. In a lecture on the virtues of the originalist
approach, he "hasten[ed] to confess that in a crunch [he] may prove a
faint-hearted originalist.' 1 44 Scalia continued, "I cannot imagine myself, any more than any other federal judge, upholding a statute that
imposes the punishment of flogging. But then I cannot imagine such a
case[ ] arising either.' 1 45 Unfortunately, the limits of Justice Scalia's
imagination may not be suitable grounds to stand at ease in a social
and political environment where some believe that torture is an ap146
propriate means to deal with terrorism.
141. A confrontation with historicism was in no small part at the heart of Strauss's attempt to
resurrect classical political philosophy. It is in his works that the most thoroughgoing critiques
are presented. See STRAUSS, supra note 2; STRAUSS, supra note 76; see also LEO STRAUSS, STUDIES IN PLATONIC POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1983) (collecting Strauss's final statements on classical
political philosophy); Leo Strauss, On Collingwood's Philosophy of History, 5 REV. METAPHYSics 559 (1952) (critiquing a historicist interpretation of philosophy).
142. See supra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
143. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 587 (2005) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 368 (1989)).
144. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989).
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen J. Greenberg &
Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005); Charles Krauthammer, The Truth About Torture, WKLY. STAN-
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On the other end of the spectrum, Justice Brennan's interpretation
of the Eighth Amendment in light of human dignity 147 certainly helps
correct the potential excesses allowed by Justice Scalia's approach.
The problem with Justice Brennan's interpretation, and perhaps his
overall approach to constitutional text, is its apparent lack of grounding. Responding to Justice Brennan's "hope to embody a community
striving for human dignity, although perhaps not yet arrived, ' 148 Professor Harry Jaffa retorted that "Mr. Justice Brennan finds the true
meaning of the Constitution, not in the text, and not in any interpretation of the text by others, including the entire political community actprocess, but in some kind of 'striving,' albeit
ing through the political
'not yet arrived."'1 49 Jaffa has a point. There are, as constitutional
commentator George Anastaplo has pointed out, "echoes [in the
Eighth Amendment's language] of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause which attempts to protect 'life, liberty, [and] property.' "150
If the text itself contemplates the deprivation of life, can the Eighth
Amendment be read in light of a principle (in Justice Brennan's case,
human dignity) that seemingly contradicts the text? In criticizing the
infamous slavery case of Dred Scott v. Sandford,151 Jaffa has routinely
invoked the principles of the Declaration of Independence as grounds
that the Court ought to have recognized Dred Scott as a human being
"with certain unalienable rights" despite his status as a slave.' 5 2 With
respect to the death penalty, Professor Bruce Ledewitz has brought
attention to an important inconsistency in Jaffa's constitutional
interpretation:
[Tihe attack on capital punishment through the Eighth Amendment
is much more consistent with the text of the Constitution than is
Professor Jaffa's attack on slavery. The constitutional text seems
DARD, Dec. 5, 2005, http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/400
rhqav.asp.
147. See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
148. Harry V. Jaffa, What Were the "OriginalIntentions" of the Framers of the Constitution of
the United States?, in HARRY V. JAFFA WITH BRUCE LEDEWITZ ET AL., ORIGINAL INTENT AND
THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION: A DISPUTED QUESTION 11, 17 (1994) (quoting Justice
William J.Brennan, Jr., To the Text and Teaching Symposium at Georgetown University (Oct.
12, 1985), reprinted in THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, THE GREAT DEBATE:
WRITTEN CONSTITUTION

INTERPRETING OUR

(1986)).

149. Id. at 18.
150. ANASTAPLO, supra note 21, at 88 (second alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST.
amend. V).
151. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
152. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (1776). For Jaffa's interpretation of the
Declaration and his specific application of it to the Dred Scott case, see HARRY V. JAFFA, A
NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR 73-152
(2000); HARRY V. JAFFA, STORM OVER THE CONSTITUTION (1999); and Jaffa, supra note 148, at
13-15.
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actually to endorse slavery. Conversely, the Eighth Amendment
was viewed at the time of its introduction and criticized as an invitation to abolish capital punishment. Reading the reference to deprivation of life in the Fifth Amendment as if it had been intended to
quiet the fear of abolition is more weight than this reforming provision will bear. The due process clause is more easily interpreted as
quieting the opposite fear: that the death penalty would be widespread and discretionary if the Eighth Amendment were not interpreted to eliminate it. To exclude the due process clause might have
suggested153that a citizen- could be deprived of his life without due
process.

Ledewitz points out that if slavery can be condemned on the basis of
the natural right principles of the Declaration, so too can the death
1 54
penalty, the Framer's opinions and intentions notwithstanding.
Returning now to the respective approaches of Justice Scalia and
Justice Brennan, a synthesis is possible. Justice Scalia's interpretive
approach has the recognized benefit of consistency, a consistency
borne out of grounding the meaning of the Punishments Clause in the
legal tradition of the United States. It does not, however, provide a
robust level of protection; Justice Brennan's approach does. Yet
Jaffa's criticism is not entirely unfounded; Justice Brennan's interpretation smacks of a subjective construction or, worse, an arrogant pronouncement of a profound moral insight that may continue to evade
the rest of humanity until some undisclosed point in the future. It is
not inconceivable that such an approach might allow justices with different proclivities than Justice Brennan to make their own profound
moral insights. This would lead back to the problem of instability, and
would no doubt raise further questions of legitimacy with respect to
judges imposing their preferences on the law. To avoid this, holding
to a principle set forth beyond the independent reasoning of any justice or group of justices is imperative. It is here that looking to the
higher principles enshrined in the Declaration of Independence can
serve as a traditional grounding for Justice Brennan's reading of the
text in the light of human dignity. Human dignity is not just a value
pulled out of thin air, but rather a foundational principle of the American Republic. Of the three rights enumerated in the text of the Declaration itself, life is first. 155 Even earlier in the text of the Declaration
is the universal statement that "all men are created equal."'1 56 That is,
153. Bruce Ledewitz, Judicial Conscience and Natural Rights: A Reply to Professor Jaffa, in
HARRY V. JAFFA WITH BRUCE LEDEWITZ ET AL., ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS OF THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 148, at 109, 116 (citation omitted).

154. Id.
155. THE
156. Id.

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

para. 2 (1776).
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there is a fundamental moral equality amongst all human beings that
is beyond the law to either give or take away. Human dignity-the
principle by which all punishments ought to abide-is central to the
principles of the Republic to which the Constitution gives legal
I
structure.
A post-historicist Punishments Clause jurisprudence, then, is a jurisprudence that does not yield to social fiat. Instead, it looks to the
foundational principles of the Nation itself to apply the text of the
Eighth Amendment to honor those principles. Since these principles
are invariable and will remain with the American Republic until its
dissolution, this post-historicist jurisprudence is not ahistoricial.
While it is regrettably true that the transcendent origin of these principles in "the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God" 157 may not garner
the same recognition today that they did three centuries ago, even the
hardened skeptic can assent to the fact that they are still at the heart
of the Republic.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Comment has analyzed the Supreme Court's historicist Punishments Clause jurisprudence and exposed its theoretical and practical
shortcomings. It has also demonstrated that the Court's attempt to
blend into this jurisprudence a rule of independent judgment, along
with the use of legal and scientific positivism, has been unsuccessful.
This Comment has further argued that the Court's historicist approach leaves uncertainties in the law itself and presents no guarantee
that, based on the transient opinions of society, there is an inevitable
move for a better or more humane understanding of what constitutes
a "cruel and unusual" punishment. In place of this approach, this
Comment has proposed not only that there is a horizon beyond historicism where the Court may look to interpret the Eighth Amendment,
but that this horizon is within the sphere of the American Republic
itself. A post-historicist Punishments Clause jurisprudence can and
ought to be grounded in the founding principles of the Republic as
enumerated in the Declaration of Independence. In doing so, the
Court may avoid the error of Socrates' comrade in the Minos who
believed "without qualification, that law is the official opinion of the
city. '1 58 Surely, as Socrates has told us, "it wouldn't fit harmoniously
157. Id. para. 1.
158. PLATO, Minos, in THE ROOTS OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: TEN FORGOTTEN SOCRATIC
DIALOGUES 53, 55 (Thomas L. Pangle ed., 1987).
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for the wicked official opinion to be law," insofar as we "ought to
think about law as being something noble and seek it as good." 159
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